Este repertorio registra los artículos sobre Platón que se encuentran en la Hemeroteca de la Biblioteca Central de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. El listado abarca las publicaciones existentes hasta el primer semestre del año 2000.

A timeless critique holds that the radical is animated by a deep sense of certainty that leads to the worst excesses. By distinguishing essentialist and non-essentialist forms of radicalism, Ernesto Laclau offers a “coalitional” form of radicalism that, in effect, responds to this critique. Laclau deconstructs classical forms of radicalism, such as Marxism, to show how one can use some of their formal components, such as dichotomic rhetoric and a notion of utopia, without assuming that their particular content (e.g., (...) the figure of the proletarian or the socialist utopia) entails the permanent abolition of oppression. Laclau’s radicalism enables political actors to build their own radical front by politicizing and creating linkages between issues. Laclau thus avoids the epistemic certainty of classical radicalisms. However, in the interest of politically effective radicalism, he deploys a localized form of certainty that has an ambivalent potential for intolerance and violence. (shrink)

Being based on the Ernesto Garzon’s analysis of the authors from the cur- rent of the “nature of the things”, the goal of the present article is to demonstrate that the postulates of this current do not criticize and refute the legal positivism from the epoch but quite on the contrary, they support and even complement it. The similarities between the assumptions uphold by authors from the two currents lead to the conclusion that the theses of the legal positivism (...) and the “nature of the things” streams have never been in firm opposition as previously thought.Resumen:Basado en la exposición de Ernesto Garzón sobre los autores de la llamada “naturaleza de las cosas”, este artículo pretende hacernos ver que las tesis de esta corriente fuera de criticar o de refutar las bases del positivismo jurídico de la época, tal y como pretendían hacer, en realidad, lo soportan y hasta lo complementan. Las similitudes que hay entre las posturas de algunos autores pertenecientes a ambas corrientes, llevan a que el autor niegue que haya existido una disputa “real” entre ambas tesis. (shrink)

Resumen: Los trabajos abordan, desde diferentes perspectivas a la categoría de sujeto como una categoría crucial del pensamiento contemporáneo. El ámbito de preocupaciones es amplio: la perspectiva del filósofo norteamericano S Cavell quien hace una originalísima recepción de la herencia de Austin y Wittgenstein; la perspectiva fenomenológica de Sartre en diálogo y conflicto con la del psicoanálisis lacaniano y las reconceptualizaciones de la ideología realizadas por Louis Althusser; la constitución del sujeto en tensión entre la sujeción al poder y las (...) posibilidadesde resistencia según la perspectiva de Judith Butler; una relectura de la implicación de estructura y sujeto en la perspectiva estructural abierta por Saussure y continuada por Lévi-Strauss, Benveniste y Lacan, tema que recibe un tratamiento circunscripto al pensamiento del argentino Ernesto Laclau, en el que se distinguen distintas etapas; las implicaciones que los eventos fundamentales de la historia del siglo XX acarrean para una conceptualización de la subjetividad en la perspectiva de Theodor Adorno y las limitaciones que la conceptualización de la obra de arte como juego en la obra de Gadamer impone a la concepción moderna de la subjetividad. -/- Índice: Presentación del compilador La crítica de Heidegger a la noción de sujeto: un análisis a partir de la incidencia de su reflexión sobre la técnica y el lenguaje, Luciana Carrera Aizpitarte El juego como auto-representación y modo de ser de la obra de arte en la estética hermenéutica de Gadamer, Paola Belén El yo sobre la línea de ficción: análisis de las concepciones de Sartre y Lacan, Luisina Bolla El poder y el sujeto. Sujeción, norma y resistencia en Judith Butler, Matías Abeijón Theodor W. Adorno: la crítica al sujeto después de Auschwitz, Gustavo Robles Estructura, discurso y subjetividad, Pedro Karczmarczyk Transformaciones, rupturas y continuidades entre la perspectiva de Ernesto Laclau y la tradición (post)estructuralista, Hernán Fair La recuperación del sujeto: escepticismo, autoconocimiento y escritura en S. Cavell, Guadalupe Reinoso . (shrink)

This paper takes a phenomenological perspective regarding the difficulties encountered in daily life by man in prehistory. I argue that the economics of beingnecessarily establishes man as a being that must make choices. Of these, man must eventually arrive at the realization that higher, rather than lower choices will safeguard human survival, well being and allow for prosperity. The economics of being is a form of identifying economic choice-making as a natural disposition of man’s. It is the latter condition that (...) makes man act in the world. However, even though man must act, action cannot be blind. Instead, human action is motivated and guided by man’s sense of interiority. That is, man’s existential capacity for self-reflection is also what can deliver us to autonomous rule. This form of reflective choice-making is a creative act. The paper attempts to trace this aspect of the human condition back to prehistory, in order to demonstrate that societies, institutions, invention, technology, artistic creation and economic responsibility come about as the result of human industriousness. None of the aforementioned are creations of modern man. (shrink)

El presente trabajo hace un análisis de la corta narración “decisión ante el trapecio”, escrita por el autor con motivo de la vida y obra del novelista Franz Kafka. Con ello se invita al lector ha reconocer en la aplicación del método (o enfoque) fenomenológico del “Análisis reflexivo”, una herramienta conceptual importante para lograr una mejor comprensión de las relaciones entre el arte y la filosofía. La soledad, el solipsismo y obviamente “las relaciones con el Otro”, son temas recurrentes tanto (...) a la literatura como a la fenomenología de Husserl, y por este motivo se propone el análisis partiendo de la narración literaria. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify and defend the distinction by Isaiah Berlin between “negative liberty” on the one hand, and “positive” and “communal liberty” on the other. This distinction has been attacked by those who believe it breaks the necessary harmony with equality or fraternity, virtues that many progressive authors place on the same plane as freedom. Instead of speaking of “negative liberty,” as proposed by Berlin, we propose to call it “classical” or “formal” liberty. In turn, rather than speaking (...) of “positive” liberty, we propose to say “possessive liberty” and “communal liberty.” Thus, Isaiah Berlin should have spoken of three concepts of liberty and have stressed that the latter two may be destructive of the first. Possessive and communal liberty can be significant aspects of a society, but should not be confused with personal liberty. The promotion of possessive and comunal liberty is often accompanied by invasions of formal liberty. (shrink)

O presente estudo pretende expor algumas das linhas fundamentais sobre as concepções antropológicas e de filosofia moral implícitas na colonização espanhola na América do século XVI, bem como nos discursos que pretenderam promover uma reforma moral da empresa colonizadora, questionando diretamente seus fundamentos antropológicos e éticos. Dentro deste quadro mais geral, o objetivo principal do trabalho será o de abordar a atuação de Bartolomé de Las Casas e os efeitos de seus escritos apologéticos e denunciatórios no interior de um projeto (...) teórico acerca de uma etnologia comparada e de uma visão sobre o estado de natureza e o nativo americano. (shrink)

RESUMO:O objetivo de nossa exposição é mostrar que, em sua Carta a d’Alembert, Rousseau retoma o debate clássico sobre a relação entre o teatro e a moral nas mesmas bases estabelecidas por Platão. Sendo assim, a disputa sobre o teatro tem, da parte de Rousseau, uma objetividade que não encontramos no artigo de d’Alembert. Portanto, não se trata de uma diferença de opinião entre Rousseau e d’Alembert, mas da capacidade filosófica de bem compreender o que é próprio ao teatro e (...) à moralidade. ABSTRACTThe purpose of this article is to show how Rousseau, in his Letter to D’Alembert, takes up the classic debate between theatre and morals on the same grounds established by Plato. In Rousseau’s work, the debate about theatre has an objectivity that we do not find in D’Alembert’s article. Therefore, what is involved is not a difference of opinion between Rousseau and D’Alembert, but a difference in the philosophical ability to fully understand what concerns both theatre and morality. (shrink)

En este artículo, trato de mostrar la pertinencia de Fenomenología de la percepción para responder a los desafíos de la filosofía en un mundo, a la vez, desgarrado y globalizador. Si dejamos de lado la dimensión teorética del mundo, recuperamos el fondo oscuro de la existencia, fondo de todos los espacios. Se trataría de un espacio primigenio en el que se encuentra el vínculo afectivo que es el propio de la experiencia de los niños y los primitivos. Lo vivido de (...) estos espacios implica empero una pérdida del espacio de juego gracias al cual «hay mundo», como apertura y posibilidad de intersubjetividad. Pero la respuesta ante el psicologismo de Merleau-Ponty supone un giro respecto a la filosofía tradicional al conseguir mantener cercana a su conciencia las conciencias otras del esquizofrénico o del niño. (shrink)

El Tractatus Logico-philosophicus es una obra filosófica de una enorme complejidad. Su estilo es sentencioso, por momentos oracular, otras veces casi telegráfico, de manera que en muchas ocasiones cuesta discernir los nexos entre las diversas proposiciones. Con todo, en el "Prólogo", en particular en sus observaciones sobre la cuestión del límite, Wittgenstein proporciona algunas indicaciones de las que conviene tomar debida nota para la interpretación de la obra. Este trabajo es fundamentalmente una propuesta de interpretación de estas observaciones, de su (...) proyección sobre el Tractatus, de su relevancia para comprender la naturaleza, de la ruptura operada por Wittgenstein en las Investigaciones filosóficas. -/- THE PROBLEM OF THE LIMIT AND THE TRACTATUS AS A TRANSCENDENTAL REFLECTION Tractatus Logico-philosophicus is a very complex philosophical work. It is writen by means of short phrases in a oracular style. Some parts are telegraphic, in such a way that it becomes difficult to elucidate the links among the different propositions. However, in the "preface", in particular in his remarks about the cuestion of the limit, Wittgenstein gives us some indications that we should consider carefully in order to interpret his work. This paper is basically a proposal to interpret the above mentioned remarks, of how they illuminate Tractatus, of how they are relevant to understand the nature of the profound change that Wittgenstein introduces in Philosophical Investigations. (shrink)

Science starts out with the idea of a person as billions of neurons housed in a body that is a cloud of particles. Common sense starts out with the idea of a person having capacities belonging to a single individual. The common sense person does not have parts. Our objectifying science slowly takes over the person as it tends toward physical materialism. Where will it end? What is being gradually pushed out of the world? If science had already taken over, (...) if the categories of neuroscience were complete, then it would be possible to speculate about its relation to earlier stages of thought. However, that is not the situation. The categories of science have yet to emerge. The puzzling character of new scientific objects reveals that we are on the threshold of profound conceptual change. The Humanities are at a crossroad. Do the Humanities scoff at the encroachment of science and risk the fate of those who resisted the Copernican revolution? Do they embrace the changes only to be burned at the stake like those who accepted the Copernican revolution? I suggest that the Humanities mobilize their collective power to create the categories in terms of which science will explicate the very idea of a person. Over the last fifty years, philosophers in the Kantian tradition have offered strategies for developing the new categories in humanistic terms. One approach follows “color” and “consciousness” through their passage from a common sense image of the world to a developing scientific image. It is a journey that illustrates the problems and the puzzles ahead. It indicates the perils of the next recategorization of the world. (shrink)

Science starts out with the idea of a person as billions of neurons housed in a body that is a cloud of particles. Common sense starts out with the idea of a person having capacities belonging to a single individual. The common sense person does not have parts. Our objectifying science slowly takes over the person as it tends toward physical materialism. Where will it end? What is being gradually pushed out of the world? If science had already taken over, (...) if the categories of neuroscience were complete, then it would be possible to speculate about its relation to earlier stages of thought. However, that is not the situation. The categories of science have yet to emerge. The puzzling character of new scientific objects reveals that we are on the threshold of profound conceptual change. The.. (shrink)

La Orientación Educativa en la Enseñanza Reglada.

A obra de Suely Rolnik traz para o debate filosófico contemporâneo a possibilidade de pensar os dias de hoje a partir de conceitos psicanalíticos e filosóficos. O livro em si não trata especificamente a área da educação, mas o fio condutor criado pela autora, o que ela denomina de descolonização do inconsciente, bem como a prática micropolítica que se dá sobre os processos de subjetivação e os demais conceitos apresentados: pulsão, linguagem, desejo, imaginação, criação, afetos e outros; são absolutamente relevantes (...) para a propositura de uma educação revolucionária e contemporânea. (shrink)

Público el centro de la participación política de los ciudadanos. Sin embargo, las diferencias materiales que existen entre los individuos pueden influir de una forma decisiva en el desarrollo del proceso deliberativo.En este artículo examino la forma en que desde esta teoría de la democracia se ha hecho frente a este problema. Aunque encontramos notables diferencias entre los autores, todos ellos defienden la necesidad de garantizar una igual influencia de los ciudadanos en el proceso político.

In this paper we examine the issues of the 1764 published essay – specially of its third section – which help us to reconstruct Kant’s position in the mind-body problem. The philosopher explores here the roots of pathological diseases and refers to a theory, exposed by Johann August Unzer in the weekly Der Arzt, which relates the Kantian point of view with the contemporary Functionalism in Philosophy of Mind. In this way we are pursuing a train of thought previously not (...) taken into account in the Kantian research. (shrink)

Traducción anotada de Pedro Mantas España. Continuación de la traducción de esta obra de Adelardo de Bath, cuya primera parte apareció en el número anterior de esta misma Revista.

My goal is to illustrate Descartes’ reliance on two quite different and competing interpretations of objective reality by explaining how each is used in defending his causal axioms. The initial criticism comes from Caterus (and is later taken up by Gassendi) who charges that Descartes makes it appear as if the thought in its objective aspect (the intentional entity) is really distinct from the thought qua modification of the mind (i.e., the thought in its formal aspect). This implies that the (...) object-of-the-thought is actually distinct from the thought-of-the-object in which case, (a) Descartes cannot account for the purported relation between the two, and (b) the intentional entity must exemplify properties which belong neither “immaterially” to mental substance nor concretely to physical substance. Descartes rejects Caterus’ assessment of his position: he has not introduced a fourth kind of real entity into the causal order distinct from the mind, its modifications, and the physical object thought of. However, in responding to Caterus, Descartes implicitly appeals to a Suarezian theory of intentionality in which reference to the ostensibly separate reality of the objective entity is reducible to the formal concept: the thought-of-the-object is not really distinct from the object-of-thought. Clearly, Descartes cannot explicitly use the Suarezian theory because it relies on a system of causal explanation (the doctrine of the species “flitting through the air”) which Descartes rejects on scientific grounds. I shall argue that Descartes is committed to a notion of the “form” of the mind, viz., a modification of mind, which should allow for a non-relational modeling of the thought qua modification of the mind and its intentional object, but that he cannot consistently attribute to mental acts enough structure to support his theory. (shrink)

Among late Renaissance and early Modern philosophers, the concepts of “sympathy” or “harmony” are a recurring theme. My goal is to show that theories which rely on such concepts, far from being an attempt to avoid the emerging mechanistic or empirical trends, are actually the form which these trends took in the wake of an increasing disenchantment with Aristotelian psychology. Fracastorius, Suarez and Descartes provide the texts: their accounts of the interaction between cognitive faculties exhibit a growing awareness that the (...) conception of causality had to be supplemented. And while each appears to share the general belief that aspects of the Thomistic-Aristotelian framework can survive the necessary changes, they disagree about how much dogmatic psychology has to be discarded. What they decide to leave in and the reasons given for discarding the rest provide insight into the history of explanation. It is in the metaphysics of harmony that we can trace the early growth of Rationalism. (shrink)

My goal is to illustrate Descartes’ reliance on two quite different and competing interpretations of objective reality by explaining how each is used in defending his causal axioms. The initial criticism comes from Caterus (and is later taken up by Gassendi) who charges that Descartes makes it appear as if the thought in its objective aspect (the intentional entity) is really distinct from the thought qua modification of the mind (i.e., the thought in its formal aspect). This implies that the (...) object-of-the-thought is actually distinct from the thought-of-the-object in which case, (a) Descartes cannot account for the purported relation between the two, and (b) the intentional entity must exemplify properties which belong neither “immaterially” to mental substance nor concretely to physical substance. Descartes rejects Caterus’ assessment of his position: he has not introduced a fourth kind of real entity into the causal order distinct from the mind, its modifications, and the physical object thought of. However, in responding to Caterus, Descartes implicitly appeals to a Suarezian theory of intentionality in which reference to the ostensibly separate reality of the objective entity is reducible to the formal concept: the thought-of-the-object is not really distinct from the object-of-thought. Clearly, Descartes cannot explicitly use the Suarezian theory because it relies on a system of causal explanation (the doctrine of the species “flitting through the air”) which Descartes rejects on scientific grounds. I shall argue that Descartes is committed to a notion of the “form” of the mind, viz., a modification of mind, which should allow for a non-relational modeling of the thought qua modification of the mind and its intentional object, but that he cannot consistently attribute to mental acts enough structure to support his theory. (shrink)

Integration Area C. Nature, sources, and limits of human knowledge; roles of perception, reason, testimony, and intuition in acquiring rational beliefs; e.g. science, mathematics, values, the arts, religion, social issues, and psychological states. G.E. Integration IC.

Resenha do livro de: ALVES NETO, Rodrigo Ribeiro. Alienações do mundo: uma interpretaçáo da obra de Hannah Arendt . Rio de Janeiro/Sáo Paulo: Editora PUC-Rio/Edições Loyola, 2009, 216 p.

Los numerosos interrogantes planteados por el texto sobre el Intelecto Activo en el De Anima de Aristóteles lo convirtieron en un problema central del pensamiento árabe y cristiano. La interpretación de Avempace, cuyo Entendimiento Agente sintetiza los caracteres del Motor Inmóvil aristotélico y del Nous de Plotino, de Dios en definitiva, supone una respuesta de indudable originalidad.The plurality of issues brought up by the text concerning the Active Intellect in the Aristotle´s De Anima made that text to turn into a (...) primary question in the Arab and Christian thought. According to Avempace´s interpretation of it, the Agent Intellect summarizes the traits and notes of Aristotle´s Motionless Motor and Plotinus´ Nous, i. e. of God in short, which no doubt amounts to an original view of the point in question. (shrink)

We study how the optimal contract in team production is a¤ected when employees are averse to inequity in the sense described by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). By designing a reward scheme that creates inequity o¤ the desired equilibrium, the employer can induce employees to perform e¤ort at a lower total wage cost than when they are not inequity averse. We also show that the optimal output choice might change when employees are inequity averse. Finally, we show that an employer can (...) gain, and never lose, by designing a contract that accounts for inequity aversion, even if employees have standard preferences. (shrink)

En este artículo argumento que un escéptico pirrónico puede recurrir a una interpretación condicional o a una interpretación disyuntivista de los enunciados de la forma "me parece que p" para mostrar que puede reportar sus experiencias sin adquirir los compromisos epistémicos normalmente asumidos al..

Con ocasión de la edición digital de sus Obras Completas y... nada más.

My dissertation is a critical study of Jose Ortega Y Gasset's attempt to reconcile his notion of lived-experience , which is fundamentally immediate experience, with his idea of life as vital-reason. But life as vital reason is, itself, best understood as consisting of life as a rational-existential project. This, in effect is Ortega's manner of fusing idealism and realism. The result of this mediation is to be interpreted as the self-with-things or what amounts to: I-in-the-world. Man is never what he (...) is in his immediacy and therefore he must create his essence through a self-conscious existential project. Thus, Ortega's notion of life as radical reality is the culmination of an underlying dialectic that is present throughout his work. That is, man's self-awareness of his life as a pre-reflective extranatural phenomenon vis-a-vis the material world can only be understood through reflection and therefore never in its immediacy. Therefore I conclude that for Ortega the synthesis of these apparently antithetical notions culminates in a form of subjective idealism given that primacy is necessarily attributed to the self over the external world. Even though I accept the fundamental tenets of his argument concerning the synthesis of Realism and Idealism and Rationalism and Vitalism, I have focused upon the inherent tension that exists in any such reflective endeavor. I believe that due to Ortega's emphasis that all reflection must originate and therefore concern itself with life as phenomenon, his philosophy necessarily gives primacy to the self over the material world . In arguing "Yo Soy Yo Y Mis Circumstancias" Ortega stresses the character of the Rational Vitalism that results from my self-awareness of my life as a problem for reflection that is forged through my necessary dealings with the world. The result of this self-knowledge is the foundation of a metaphysics of life that is best understood as man as radical reality. (shrink)